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In the last century it was the fashion to approach the rules
of evidence -with a deal of reverence. Lord Ellenborough, that
staunch conservative, spoke in the approved manner when he
introduced a judgment on a point of evidence by these words:
"I should be extremely sorry if anything fell from the Court
upon this occasion which would in any degree break in upon
those sound rules of evidence which have been established for
the security of life, liberty, and property; but in declaring our
opinion updn the admissibility of the evidence in question, we
shall lay down no rule which can induce such ruinous conse-
quences, nor go beyond the limits of those cases which have
been often recognized. ..
Today, on the other hand, the most authoritative writer on
the subject, whose hand has done more than any other to
shape its contours in the last two decades, is ready to reduce
the rules of evidence almost to mere discretionary canons for
the guidance of the trial court--canons from which he may
depart in any instances where their particular application seems
unwise.2 It is believed also that the temper of lawyers and
judges generally reflects likewise the feeling that the law of
evidence should by no means be accepted as a fairly stable legal
inheritance such as the law of real property, or of -ills. Like
all procedural rules, those of evidence are losing their sharp-
ness of definition, their clearness of outline. The'whole subject
is in process of deliquesceice, and we feel only this certainty as
to the future of the rules of evidence, that so far as they survive
at all, they will be fewer and simpler, and far looser of applica-
tion than those of today.
In this transitional era, it may be justifiable to discuss some
phases of the law of evidence which may have litLle direct prac-
tical application, solely because they bring us to a reconsidera-
tion of some of the foundations upon which the structure has
rested in the past; this may reveal some of those crevice&
through which the winds of change may blow. These motives
have prompted the writer to examine some of the implication
I Higham v. Ridgway, 10 East 109, 116 (1808).
2 WIGMO, EVMEnaE (2d ed. 1923) § 8a; ef. MoaGN, TnE LAw w
EvmEacE (1927) Ch. I.
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of the theory of that most far-reaching of evidential doctrines,
the hearsay rule.
One intriguing question which stands at the hearsay thresh-
hold is whether the hearsay stigma attaches only to evidence
of what someone has previously said or written, or whether it
.nay also include evidence of what he has done. It is familiar
doctrine -that the hearsay rule applies only to evidence of out-
of-court statements offered for the purpose of proving that the
facts are as asserted in the statement. Evidence of such state-
ments made for any other purpose, e. g., to prove the making
of a declaration as evidence of the publication of a slander, or
to show that the one who uttered or heard it had notice of the
facts asserted, is, of course, not hearsay. It is only where the
statement is offered as the basis for the inferences, first, that
the declarant believed it, and, second, that the facts were in
accordance with his belief, that the evidence is hearsay. These
inferences are believed to be too unreliable to permit the evi-
dence to be thus used by a jury. The declarant, in the first
place, may be consciously lying and hence not have believed
what he says, and second, even though he believed it, he may,
due to faulty inf6rmation or observation, have been mistaken.
All this is the well-worn everyday logic leading to the exclusion
of hearsay statements. Does it apply to anything other than
statements? More particularly does it apply to evidence of
conduct? For example, if the sanity of X is in question, is it
hearsay to prove that Y, who has been shown to have kmown X
well all his life, agreed to marry him, when such evidence is
offered tQ support the inference that Y believed him sane, and
hence that he was sane? If the issue is as to which member
of a group insulted S, is evidence that B, her brother, who
heard the insult, and thereupon attacked D, one of the crowd,
hearsay when offered to show that D was the insulter? Other
examples, gleaned from the opinions 'of the judges in the leading
case oii the subject 3 are: (1) proof that the underwriters have
paid the amount of the policy, as evidence of the lossv of a
ship; (2) proof of payment of a wager, as evidence of the hap-
pening of the eVent which was the subject of the bet; (3) pre-
cautions of the family, to show the person involved was a
lunatic;. (4) as evidence of sanity, the election of the person
in question to high office; (5) "the conduct of a physician who
permitted a will to be executed by a sick testator," (6) "the
conduct of a deceased captain on a question of seaworthiness,
who, after examining every part of the vessel embarked in it
with his family."
3 See quotations from Wright v. Tatham, 5 Cl. & P. 670, 739 (1838);
and same case below, 7 Ad. & El. 313, 386 (1837), in Wiooan, op. oft.
§ 267.
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These instances bring out in clear relief the problem: does
apparent belief translated into action stand in any better case
as respects the hearsay rule than apparent belief translated into
Statements?
By way of prelude, it must be observed that the line of
cleavage between action and statements is one that must be drawn
in the light of substance, rather than form. No one would con-
tend, if, in response to a question "who did. it?", one of the
auditors held up his hand, that this gesture could be treated
as different from an oral or written statement, in the applica-
tion of the hearsay rule, any more than could the sign-speech
of the dumb. So also a gesture may accompany and give mean-
ing to speech, as where A "identifies" B as a sought-for crim-
inal,4 or where an eye-witness "points out" the scene of an
accident.5 Obviously, though described in terms of conduct,
the actions are as much a part of the speaker's effort at ex-
pression as his words are, and of course in all such cases where
the gesture or other act is done, so far as appears, solely for
the purpose of expression it is on a parity for all present pur-
poses with any purely verbal statement.
On the other trnd, it seems equally clear that since hearsay
is limited to assertions offered for their truth, conduct may
properly include words used for other purposes than assertion,
e. g., words of imprecation, words of discharge to a servant,
words used in voting for a candidate for office, words of gift
or conveyance, and our identical problem would arise where
these words are used to prove the belief of the declarant regard-
ing a certain fact, for the purpose of showing the truth of the
belief-the same problem in another form as arises when the
actor's non-verbal conduct is offered for similar purposes. Of
this last type was the evidence offered in the leading case above
referred to,5 i. e., evidence that a letter was written to the de-
cedent consulting him seriously in matters of business was
offered to show that the writer believed him sane, as proof
of his sanity. Of similar type would be evidence of an official's.
revocation in another state of a driver's license to show the
driver's unfitness for employment,7 or evidence of the decision
of the Superintendent of Banks to close a bank as evidence of
the bank's insolvency," or evidence of an offer of a position as.
a choir-singer as evidence that the offeree was a skilled musi-
4 McBrIde v. State, 20 Ala. App. 434, 102 So. 728 (1925).
5Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 86 So. 469 (1920) ; Byrd v. State,
89 Tex. Cr. Rep. 371, 231 S. W. 399 (1921).
(Wxight v. Tatham, supra note 3.
7 Cf. McCurdy v. Flibotte, 83 N. H. 91, 139 AtI. 367 (1927).8 Cf. Smith v. Olson, 50 S. D. 81, 208 I. W. 585 (1926).
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clan.0 The distinction may illustrated by supposing that, on an
issue (in a suit betveen third parties) of whether at a certain
time A was indebted in a certain sum to B, evidence is offered,
(a) that A wrote to B admitting the debt, (b) that A pid the
amount of the alleged debt to B, and (c) that A requested C
to pay the amount of the claimed debt to B. The evidence under
(a) is typical hearsay, and our problem here is whether the
non-verbal conduct (b), and the verbal, but not assertive, con-
duct (c), is also hearsay.
Strangely enough, though the problem seems one which, theo-
retically at least, brings into question the whole scope of the
hearsay rule, it has only once received any adequate discussion
in any decided case, so far as the writer is aware. In that case,
indeed, the arguments pro and con were marshaled in dress-
parade, by minds as acute as those of the senior Pollock, qnd
Scarlett, Creswell, and Starkie, at the bar, and the master intel-
lect of Baron Parke, on the bench. It was a celebrated and
hard-fought cause, which wound its way from the common law
courts to chancery and back again, and was argued and re-
argued, and elicited numerous opinions, in the King's Bench,
the Exchequer Chamber, and the House of Lords, which fill
literally hundreds of pages in the reports. One John Marsden
was a country gentleman, seized of certain rich manors in
Lancashire, who died at a ripe old age, leaving his estate by will
to one Wright, who had risen from a menial station to the
position of steward and general man of business for Marsden.
Marsden's heir at law, Admiral Tatham, in 1830 instituted
litigation, including an action of ejectment for the real estate,
to oust the menial intruder from these manors, on the ground,
inter alia, of Marsden's mental incompetency to make a will.
So great was the prejudice supposed to prevail in Lancashire,
that one of the branches of the litigation was tried in the York
assizes. At the ejectment trial, the ex-steward Wright, the de-
fendant, supporting the will, offered in evidence several letters
all wtitten to the deceased by' persons no longer living. Among
them was one from a relatiie in America, giving news and ex-
-pressing affection, and of a tenor such as would be written to
one of. ordinary understanding, and there were likewise three
others which related to matters of business which presumably
would only be written to one who was believed by the writers
to be able to comprehend and act intelligently upon practical
affairs. 0 All these letters were admitted by the trial judge as
1 Cf. Carpenter v. Asheville Power and Light Co., 191 N. C. 130, 131
S. E. 400 (1926).
!o The letters are set out in full in 112 Eng. Rep. Repr. 490-494 (1837).
One. of the letters, from the Vicar of the Parish, strongly urges tho
testafor to have his attorney meet with the attorney of the Parish, for
[Vol. so
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evidence of the testator's competency, and the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant sustaining the will, after hearing a
mass of other evidence which fills two volumes in the verbatim
reportn. A rule nisi for a new trial, for error in admitting
the letters, was granted, and the question of whether the letters
were properly admitted caused much "fluttering in the dove-
cotes" in English judicial ranks for the next few years. Sir
Frederick Pollock the elder, on behalf of the victorious ex-
steward, argued strongly that the letters were properly ad-
mitted, as showing "treatment' of the testator as a sane man by
those who knew him, but the King's Bench held against him,
and the case went down for a new trial, the letters were then
excluded, and this time the heir, Admiral Tatham, secured a
verdict against the will, and the question of the admissibility
of the letters again started up the rounds of the judicial ladder.
The case was twice acutely argued in the Exchequer Chamber,
and all of the judges who considered the point seemed to have
agreed in holding that the letters, in the absence of evidence that
Marsden, the addressee, acted upon or at least read them, were
inadmissible as being equivalent to hearsay evidence of the
opinions of the writers. The holding was perhaps most pithily
put by Baron Parke in these words:
"The conclusion at which I have arrived is, that proof of a
particular fact, which is not of itself a matter in issue, but
which is relevant only as implying a statement or opinion of a
third person on the matter in issue, is inadmissible in all cases
where such a statement or opinion not on oath would be of itself
inadmissible; and, therefore, in this case the letters which are
offered only to prove the competence of the testator, that is the
truth of the implied statements therein contained, were properly
rejected, as the mere statement or opinion of the writer would
certainly have been inadmissible."
This opinion prevailed with all the other judges who alluded
to this question, both in the Exchequer Chamber and on the
further appeal to the House of Lords, though the judges of the
former court were equally divided upon the question whether
the proof sufficiently showed that the testator had read and
acted on the letters so as to render them admissible on that
ground. Finally in 1838, the House of Lords ended eight years
the purpose of agreeing upon a statement of facts about some dispute
between the testator and the Parish to be ]aid before counsel to -vhose
opinions both sides should submit. Another is from a curate appointed
by the testator, written on his -esignation and e-xpressing his gratitude
and respect. Two others invite the testator to come, in company with
the steward, to certain meetings to be held apparently for purposes con-
nected -with local public business or polities.
=l 112 Eng. Rep. Repr. 492, note (a) (1837).
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of strenuous litigation by holding the letters inadmissible, and
Admiral Tatham, the heir, presumably entered at last upon his
inheritance.
In no subsequent case has the problem been brought out so
clearly-no Pollock and Parke have again crossed swords upon
it-but there are a few distinct judicial rulings in America
which announce the governing principle in the same fashion
as did the English judge in Wiight v. Tatham.
Thus, in Thompsonv . Manhafttan Ry.,22 where thei issue was
whether the plaintiff had actually suffered an injury to the spine,
as she claimed, the court rejected evidence that her physician
treated her for spinal injuries, and said:
"We think such proof was in the nature of hearsay. The
treatment of the plaintiff for a particular disease was no more
than a declaration of the physician that she was suffering from
such a disease. As the declaration would not be competent, we
think proof of the treatment would not be competent."
A similar question arises when one charged with crime claims
that the crime was committed by another, and offers evidence
that such other person took refuge in flight after the crime was
committed. Of course, evidence that this third person had con-
fessed the crime would clearly be a hearsay statement, and as
such would be excluded by most courts,23 and the question
whether evidence of flight would also be hearsay raises our
problem directly. The courts have called the flight-evidence
"hearsay" and have held it must be excluded, 4 except where it
comes within some indefinable range of proximity to the crime,
in time and space, and hence is admitted, though hearsay, as
part of the res gestae.25
An extreme instance of such identification of conduct with
statement in the alplication of the hearsay rule is presented
by some cases in the intermediate appellate courts of New York
and Texas. In these cases a claim for a breach of warranty
= 11 App. Div. 182, 42.N. Y. Supp. 896 (2d Dep't 1896).13 Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 83 Sup. Ct. 449 (1913).
But a few courts admit the evidence as a declaration against interest.
Hines v. Commonivealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S. E. 843 (1923); see WiGbIoRD,
op. cit. §§ 1476-1477.
I State v. White, 68 N. C. 158 (1872); Levison v. State, 54 Ala. 520
(1875); State v. Piernot, 167 Iowa 353, 149 N. W. 446 (1914).
U Terry v. State, 13 Ala. App. 115, 69 So. 370 (1915); People v.
Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 Pac. 65 (1924). The former case seems to
require strictly that the evidence to be part of the es gestao must show
the flight as following immediately and hence "instinctively" upon the
crime. The latter would seemingly be satisfied if there were any facts
which would fairly indicate a causal connection between the crime and
the flight.
[Vol. 39494
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of quality of goods sold was asserted, and upon the issue of
defective quality, evidence was offered for the seller that other
goods of the same lot were accepted by other purchasers without
complaint. This was held to be "hearsay." 20 There is a sprin-
kling of other cases which more or less directly suppoft the view
that "hearsay" includes conduct.17 Some are dicta and some
are explainable on other grounds.
2 oJames K. Thompson Co., Inc. v. International Compositions Co., 191
App. Div. 553, 181 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1st Dep't 1920) ; Altkrug v. William
Whitman Co., 185 App. Div. 744, 173 X. Y. Supp. 669 (Ist Dep't 1919);
George W. Saunders Live Stock Commission Co. v. Kinkaid, 163 S. W.
977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). Contra: St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Ar-
kansas & T. Grain Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 95 S. W. 656 (1906).
', Gresham v. Manning, 1 Ir. R. C. L. 125 (1867). Action by hotel
owner for obstruction of light by neighboring land-owner. On the issue
of whether the light -was actually obstructed, evidence that certain guests
refused to take the rooms alleged to be darkened, and that they gave
as their reason that they were too dark, was held hearsay and inadmiz-
sible.
Hanson v. State, 160 Ark. 329, 254 S. W. 691 (1923). On an issue of
whether a bank was in a failing condition at a certain time, evidence
that at that time other banks followed the unusual practice of demanding
payment from this bank in cash of collections made through it was held
inadmissible as hearsay. But the lack of testimonial knowledge would
seem to be a clearer objection.
In re Louck's Estate, 160 Cal. 551, 558, 117 Pac. 673, 676 (1911).
Question of survivorship as between two persons killed in the same train
wreck. The witness was asked if he knew -why L, one of the decedenti,
was placed on a stretcher and the other decedent not. Ruling out the
question was held no error. "The only purpose of such a question would
be to elicit a statement from the witness that those placing the body
on the stretcher believed Mr. Loucks was alive. Their belief was not
pertinent but only a statement of the physical facts supporting such
belief was admissible in evidence." Other objections to the question are
obvious.
In re De Laveaga's Estate, 165 Cal. 607, 133 Pac. 307 (1913). On
the issue of the sanity of a testatrix, the court said that the fact
that relatives of the testatrix by their conduct treated the testatrb: as
incompetent, and managed her affairs -without consulting her, would be
inadmissible if standing alone, but admissible where the circumstances
indicate acquiescence by the testatrLx in.this treatment where a sane
person would not acquiesce. The case in this respect is somewhat similar
to Wright v. Tatham, supra note 3, which would have admitted the letters
had it been proved that the testator had read the letters.
In re Hine, 68 Conn. 551, 37 At. 384 (1897). On issue of capacity
in a will case, evidence that boys in the street made fun of the testatrix
was excluded as "hearsay." Similar evidence was admitted by the trial
court in Wright v. Tatham, supra note 3; see 112 Eng. Rep. Repr. 492.
Pitner v. Shugart Bros., 150 Ga. 340, 103 S. E. 791 (1920). Action for
nuisance in operating a cotton gin near a dwelling. Evidence that fire
insurance rates were raised because of the operation of the gin was held,
in the head note, not elaborated in the opinion, to be "hearsay." The
issue upon which the evidence was offered was not stated.
On the other hand, there are other cases. whose implications
at least would favor the view that evidence of conduct is out-
side the pale of hearsay. Thus on questions of family relation-
ship, the fact that the person in question was treated as a
relative by members of the family is admitted.218  Similarly, the
fact that the neighbors have treated a couple as man and wife
is vidence of the marriage,.9 as is of course the evidence of
their cohabitation as such,20 and evidence that parents have
treated a child as legitimate is admissible to show legitimacy.
21
Perhaps the familiar doctrine that acts of ownership, control,
or possession are admissible (even on behalf of the actor) as
evidence of ownership 2 has a similar implication. So also,
the fact that one purports to carry out the official duties of an
People v. Bush, 300 Ill. 532, 133 N. E. 201 (1921) (evidence
that a certain inmate of an institution was not put in the venereal -ward,
offered to show that she did not have a venereal disease, excluded as
"hearsay"); Caruthers v. Balsley, 89 11. App. 559 (1899) (where the
issue was as to the disposition of a certain horse, evidence that a veter-
inarian had refused to treat him on the ground that he was a man-
eating horse held inadmissible as hearsay); Stallings v. State, 29 Tex.
App. 220, 63 S. W. 127 (1901) (to show certain debts not paid, evidence
that creditor thereafter preserved bill for same, held hearsay); Wells
v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. Rep. 451, 67 S. W. 1020 (1902) (evidence that
husband of rape victim assaulted accused inadmissible when offered to
show husband believed defendant was the assailant).; Brittain v. State, 52
Tex. Cr. Rep. 169, 105 S. W. 817 (1907) (evidence that third person
picked out marked money which had been stolen from a large lot held
hearsay): Ray v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. Rep. 196, 225 S. W. 523 (1920)
(witness having stated he had been indicted for theft at instance of express
company was asked if the express company had not made a compromise
of his claim for malicious prosecution; held, hearsay); Murray v. State,
56 Tex. Cr. Rep. 438, 120 S. W. 437 (1909) (evidence in prosecution
for liquor-selling that certain ladies asked the accused to quit selling
"Frosty" held hearsay).
Gillespie v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. Rep. 585, 166 S. W. 135 (1914).
Seduction: on issue of chaste character of prosecutrix, accused seeks to
ask whether witness who had gone riding at night with her, before the
crime, had not requested one E, who had seen them riding, not to tell
anybody. Held hearsay.
Powell v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. Rep. 367, 227 S. W. 188 (1921). The
defendant, -charged with theft for selling his grandmother's cow in her
absence, claimed to have" acted under belief that she had authorized the
sale. Evidence for the state that the grandmother on her return demanded
the cow and not the money was held hearsay.
18 Greaves v. Greenwood, 2 Ex. D. 289 (1877) ; 13 HALSBURy'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND (1910) 446.
29 Fleming v. Fleming, 4 Bing. 266 (1827); Re Thompson; Langhara
v. Thompson, 91 L. T. (N. s.) 680 (1904).
2 0 WIGBIORn, op. cit. § 268.
2 1Woodward v. Blue, 107 N. C. 407, 12 S. E. 453 (1890), and other
cases cited in Wirmonn, op. cit. § 269.22 Jones v. Williams, 2 M. & W. 326 (1837).; 13 HALSBUY'S LAws oF
ENGL4ND 442.
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office is admissible as evidence that he is the incumbent.=
It is observable, however, that all of these instances are of
the admission of what is usually presented as evidence of con-
duct of a generaized sort. It is either conduct of a given
person extending over a substantial period of time, or the united
similar actions of the members of a group such as a family
or neighborhood. It is different from evidence of an isolated
act of an individual.
The cases do offer examples of the admission of somewhat
more individualized conduct, however. Thus in Martin v. JToh=-
tn,2 4 the court held admissible, on the issue of whether a person,
then in an asylum, was competent at the time to make his will,
evidence as to whether he was then actually held under re-
straint. The case of Meserve v. Folsonz.2 must be counted on
the same side. There the plaintiff claimed to be domiciled in
Sutton, and the defendant contested this. The defendant was
allowed by the trial court to ask the plaintiff whether he was
allowed to vote in Sutton, to which .the plaintiff objected as
hearsay, but was forced to answer that he was not. On appeal
the court approved this ruling, and in response to the plaintiff's
argument that the evidence that he was not allowed to vote was
but hearsay evidence of the belief of the board of civil authority
as to his residence, said:
'But the question was not admitted for the purpose of prov-
ing what the board said or did respecting the plaintiffs resi-
dence in Sutton. It was admitted to show a fact-to show that
one of the characteristics of residence was lacking'
To be similarly classified are cases where to prove the exist-
ence of a contract, or its terms, evidence that one of the parties
has acted in a way consistent only with such a contract, or such
terms, is received. 6 Finally, cases may be found which permit
on the issue of the quality of goods evidence of the conduct of
third persons in accepting them.27
23 Commonwealth v. John McCue, 16 Gray 226 (Mass. 1860).
241 F. & F. 122, 123 (1858).
25 62 Vt. 504, 20 AtL 926 (1890).
2 6 WIGA1ORE, op. cit. § 272, citing Reg. v. Fordingbridge (Inhabitants),
E. B. & E. 678 (1858), 4 Jur. (x. s.) 951 (1858) (the fact that J D
worked as apprentice admitted to show that an apprenticeship indenture
had been executed); and Wrigley v. Cornelius, 162 I1. 92, 44 N. E. 406
(1896) (to show that a contract was as he claimed, plaintiff was allowed
to show that he acted under it, in a way consistent only with a belief
that its terms were as claimed).
27F Worth & D. C. By. v. Harlan, 62 S. W. 971 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901)
(in action for damage to vegetables in transit, consignor offers evidence
that all the vegetables before shipment had been accepted by his foreman
as being in first class condition; held admissible); St. Louis Southwestern
1930]
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Upon such a question as the one under discussion, as to
which the decisions are few and for the most part casual and
ill-considered, the opinions of the text-writers are more impor-
tant in pointing the future direction of the law than those of the
judges. Only in the treatises can we find any later discussion
which rises to the level of Pollock's argument and Baron Parke's
judgment in Wiight v. Tatham.
Wigmoreq suggests that the theory of circumstantial
evidence is broad enough to admit evidence of conduct or utter-
ances as evidencing belief of a past fact to show the truth of
the fact, but that the objection to it is "that the pretended
double inference is equivalent to giving credit to a testimonial
assertion and involves therefore a danger of evasion of the
Hearsay Rule." Without expressing. any decided opinion as to
the proper solution of the problem, he contents himself with
stating what he conceives to be the consensus of judicial opin.
ion. His conclusions are indicated in these passages:
"What exit did the common law take from this dilemma?
It followed that instinct of compromise which has affected so
many British institutions; it conceded something to both princi.
ples. In a few specific instances, mostly of traditional inheri-
tance, it yielded fully to the theory of circumstantial inference;
inla: large group of other instances, it yielded in fact, but only
because the evidence was commonly there also admissible for
other reasons, and thus it became practically of no consequence
which theory was relied on for its reception; and in all remain-
ing instances it denied the propriety of the circumstantial in-
ferenc and insisted, on the application of the Hearsay rule to
conduct Which was equivalent to an extra-judicial assertion ....
Whatever instances of opposite tendency may be noted in the
following sections, and however well-founded these may be in
a given case, they must be regarded as casual and unusual."
Chamberlayne, whose treatment of the question is much more
brief and casual, seems to have no doubt of the correctness
of the rule of Wright v. Tatham, and is clearly to be counted in
the muster of its supporters.29
A protagonist of the rule far more pugnacious than the doubt-
ing Wigmore or the colorless Chamberlayne has appeared in the
Ry. v. Arkansas & T. Grain Co., 42 Tex. Civ. App. 125, 95 S. W. 656
(1906) (damage to corn; evidence of consignor that he sold balance
of shipment, other than damaged part, as number 2 corn and that he
received no complaints from the purchasers, held not hearsay).. Compare
the dases, contra, in note 14, supra.
23 WIGMORE, op. cit. § 267; see also ibid. §§ 268-273. In § 459 he seems
to confine the hearsay rule to "utterances" but doubtless this is done
alio intuitu.
209 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE (1911) §§ 1900, 2706.
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person of Gulson, an Englishman whose Philosophy of Proof 30
deserves to be better known in this country. He attacks the
problem with enthusiasm. Throughout his book he has dis-
tinguished between "immediate" and "transmitted" evidence,
the latter being evidence which depends on the veracity or sin-
cerity of another. He classifies "conduct" when offered to found
an inference as to the actor's belief and hence to the fact be-
lieved as "transmitted." He gives as examples: (1) a man's
running away with fear on his countenance, as evidence of the
situation feared; (2) a ship-captain's embarking in a ship, as
evidence of seaworthiness; (3) a person's reading a newspaper
aloud or reporting a speech, as evidence of the contents of the
article or the speech; (4) one pointing out a spot where he says
some event has occurred; (5) the positions of the hands of a
clock as evidence of the correct time-distinguishing similar
evidence as to the hour indicated by a sundial. Mr. Gulson says
that it is impossible to draw a line between those cases of con-
duct where the circumstances furnish a reliable gqaranty of
sincerity (as in example (2) above) and those cases where they
do not, and that therefore all should be treated alike, that is,
rejected.
Likewise, another sprightly English monograph writer, Tre-
garthen,1 subscribes unquestioningly to the soundness of the
rule of exclusion.
Nevertheless, this view has by no means gone unchallenged,
but has been attacked by commentators of unusual acuteness.
Perhaps the first ripple on the waters appears in the treatise
of Judge Pitt Taylor.32 Bowing to the inevitability of sub-
mission to the result, he nevertheless points out the danger of
injustice which it involves. After mentioning the stock ex-
amples 33 of the embarking ship-captain, and the paying under-
writer, he says:
so GuLsoN, PHI-Oso HY OF Poor (1923) 5§ 193-197, 361-363, 526.
STEEAPRH, TH LAW oF HEAPSAY EVIDENCE (1915). 32: 'Tacts
that are hearsay are not necessarily written or spoken words, they may
be also the voluntary conduct of a person which so far as the facts
in issue are concerned, only amounts to a statement by the person re-
garding them. This variety of hearsay does not appear to have received
much attention in practice. Counsel probably are mot alert to recognize
as hearsay, evidence which appears in the guise of ordinary mechanical
action, and no doubt testimony as to personal conduct is often received
-without protest, which so far as the issue is concerned only amounts
to a voucher as to a relevant fact."
32 TAYLOR, LAW OF EviENmc (8th ed. 1885) §§ 570-575. The first edition
was printed in 1848, the last in 1920, and presumably the discussion
referred to has remained unchanged in general tenor through the various
editions.
'
3 See supra mote 29.
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"In most of the instances given above, as illustrating the
occasional inconvenience of the rule, the evidence rejected
amounted to something more than the mere declarations of
parties not examined on oath, nor subjected to cross-examina-
tion; for these declarations were accompcnied by acts done in
confirmation of their sincerity, and as such, the evidence was,
morally speaking, entitled to great weight. The law, however,
will not on this account allow any exception to be made in favor
of hearsay; for although, if an act done be evidence per so,
any declarations accompanying that act are ... admissible for
the purpose of illustrating, qualifying, or completing it; yet,
if the act be in its own nature irrelevant to the issue, and the
declaration be inadmissible, the union of the two cainot render
them evidence."
More recently, Mr. Eustace Seligman in an article which
dealt with another question, that of the admissibility of declara-
tions of intention, has with swift strokes of the scalpel opened
up the problem of what is hearsay, as a part of the necessary
preparation for his major surgery. That he lets in some light
on the difficulty is indicated by the excerpts in the notes. 4
34 Eustace Seligman, An Exception to tw Hearsay Rule (1912) 26
HARv. L. Rsv 146, 148-149, n. 6: "Can utterances alone be hearsay, and
can all utterances be hearsay? As to the first part of this question, it
is clear that non-verbal conduct might well be excluded; for example,
waving a signal-flag or talking in sign-language is really one form of
speech. On the other hand, some human conduct is clearly admissible;
for example, the flight of an accused may be shown to prove his guilt.
What is the distinction? In each case the conduct is used to evidence a
belief in order to prove the fact believed, and so in each case there seems
to be a possibility of the same three defects [first, inaccurate perception;
second, faulty memory; third, untruthfulness] which are usually present
in hearsay. Yet there is a difference, which lies in this: in the first
example the cdnduct was intended to convey thought, in the second it
was not. When there is no intention to communicate to any one there
is very much less chance that the act was done in order to deceive, and
hence the third and fundamental danger in admitting hearsay does not
here exist, or at least not so -strongly. Furthermore, as a rule the fact
believed in this latter class of cases is a simple one, and hence the first
and second dangers are decreased. Accordin al. th er__e aisto__o a
soun ddisfinon_ betmeen__th e-.s.es,_whi.h-T aybe_ o~nla.eA-in the
staterne~enJt itkatnlv conduct .aparently intendedto _ nve _though~tcan
comejim~ee~hzebLan of the hearsay rule. It is to be noted that the test
employed is apparent intent, for it is obviously impossible to apply an
internal standard in this connection."
To which he adds this note: "This conclusion would appear to be in
accord with the authorities, although, the distinction is not clearly made.
lnmeIL-om isgeay admissible. See Phipson on 'Evidence, 5
ed., 207. Professor Wigmore's view does not seem clear. In one section
(§ 459) he admits conduct and says that 'the hearsay rule excludes only
deliberate utterances in terms affirming a fact.' In another section (§
266 c), hoivever, he takes the position that "conduct evidence as support-
ing an inference of the person's belief and thus of the fact believed, Is
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From these it will be seen that he would admit all conduct as
evidence of the actor's belief and of the fact believed, except
where the conduct is "apparently intended to convey thought,"
i. e., "is of the sign-language type, and hence as plainly asser-
tive as words written or spoken. Thus he would admit the sea-
captain's going up the gang-plank, and the handing over of
the money by the underwriter and all the other examples listed
by Baron Parke as acts which should be excluded as hearsay.
On the other hand, following & outrance his distinction between
conduct intended to convey thought and other conduct, he would
exclude any commuiticatio, though not offered in the guise of
an assertion. Thus, h6 would have admitted, seemingly, evi-
dence that some one sent to the testator a mathematical tr'eatise,
but not, seemingly, the sending by the same person of an invita-
tion to take part in a mathematical conference. By this distinc-
tion he is able to support the actual holding in Wright v. Tat7lm,
while at the same time he repudiates the principle upon which
it was grounded.
Finally, Phipson35 the author of what is probably the most
authoritative of the later English texts on evidence, is decidedly
opposed to the inclusion of evidence of conduct within the hearsay
designation. He supports and distinguishes the result in Wight
v. Tatlwin on the ground that the evidence was inadmissible not
as hearsay but as opinion 30 and he rejects the doctrine of that
case in these terms:
"In England, the doctrine of Wright v. Tathtam, on this point,
has apparently never been followed, acts of treatment being ad-
mitted or excluded on grounds of relevancy only !and not of
hearsay. Indeed, that assertion by conduct is not convertible,
as regards admissibility, with assertion by statement, is shown
in general . . . declared inadmissible, as being open to construction as
assertions and therefore as mere hearsay. . . . Whatever instances of
opposite t~ndency may be noted in the following sections and however
well-founded they may be in a given case, they must be regarded as
casual and unusual. The learned author then cites in Sec. 268-293,
459-464, innumerable decisions of the 'opposite tendency, and the only
case cited in support of the supposed rule is Wright v. Tatham, 5 Cl. &
F. 670 (1838), -where the sending of letters to a testator by various
persons was not admitted to show their belief in his sanity and thus
the fact of his sanity. Whether or not in this case there is a hearsay
use of evidence is discussed below; but that such evidence is susceptible
of a hearsay use upon the test suggested is clear, for letters are apparently
intended to convey thought."
35 PniPSoN, THE LAw or' EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1921) 219, 220; see also
ibid 116, 117, 134, 135.
36This is a distinction -which, however valid in England, would not
support a similar holding in most American jurisdictions, which freely
admit opinion evidence of non-expert observers on sanity. WIGUORE, op.
cit. §§ 1933, 1938.
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in many cases, e. g. acting in a capacity or relationship is admis-
sible in a party's own favor, wlile his mere declaration that he
was entitled to act would not be; so, the act of attestation may
be proved but not declarations of having attested; and what is
publicly done by the tenants throughout a district is receivable
in proof of an agricultural custom, though their statements, even
on oath, of what they think the custom is, are not. Again in
legitimacy and allied cases, though a bare assertion by the
parent that a child is illegitimate would be excluded, yet the
.same assertion regarded as an item of conduct and so affording
merely presumptive evidence of illegitimacy is receivable."
(references omitted)
Probably the foregoing presents a fair sampling of the cases
and comments pro and con on the question. Fromr the data given
it seems apparent, first, that WTiaht v. Tat mm. elr esw the
more generally accepted view in holdin r that conduct, even-when
not intended as assertive, is-heaxsay w ben ffey ed to. show the
actor's belief and hence the truth of the belief, and second,
that this view has, since the leading case, received such slight
consideration in subsequent decisions which follow it, and has
evoked such contrariety of opinion among the commentators
(as well as a sprinkling of contrary decisions) that it is open
for re-examination in the light of general policy.
It is only the technique of that general reconsideration that
is of any real importance, and the assembling of the foregoing
chance driftwood from the decisions is of value only so far as
it clears the way for such a reconsideration. These decisions,
though casual and inharmonious, serve chiefly to show the situa-
tions in real life which call for the application of such theory
as we may adopt. And it is just here that the reader may ask,
"Why assume that any one solution is likely to work for all the
types of cases which seem to occur?" It will have been observed,
certainly, that the cases fall into three groups. The first and
simplest, for present purposes, are the cases of stark action with
no element of communication at all. Such is the ship-captain
example, and most of Parke's other illustrations. But in real
life, as the cases show, the element of words enters in. Thus
we may distinguish a second group wheexac-.._nd od -
plaining them are offered together. Of this type is the evidence
of the guest who refuses the hotel-room, objecting that it is too
dark, offered to show the undesirability of the room,37 and the
evidence of the rejection of similar goods as defective by other
customers, to show breach of warranty.4 Finally, the third
group comprises those cases where the conduct consists of
words solely, but words not of assertion-, but of action, such as
3 7C f. Greshain v. Manning, supra note 17.
38 Cf. cases in notes 16 andL 27, supra.
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an offer of a position (to show the offeree's sldll 3) or the
letters in Wight v. Tath wm itself. It seems. 'however. th4_t to
base any difference in results on the mere circumstance that
the conduct is verbal or non-verbal would be an unlwirable
rule of thumb not corresponding to any difference in Drobable
trustworthiness.
If all three types, then, are to be treated alike, what shall
that treatment be? The problem is one that will eventually be
solved according as the profession adopts one or another gen-
eral attitude toward the rules of proof. Possible attitudes might
favor the admission of any and all offered items of proof, as
seems to be the method in French criminal trials, or might
lean toward vesting a large discretion in the trial judge to
admit or exclude, guided only by certain general canons and
standards, as seems to be the present English tendency, or,
on the other hand, the attitude may remain one of adherence
to the present system in vogue in the United States, of sharply
defined rules prohibiting the admission of many rigidly classified
types of evidence.
The advocates of entire exclusion of evidence of conduct
to show belief, to show the truth of the fact believed, as being
hearsay, hark back to the traditional technique of jury trial
administration as it hardened in the eighteenth century. Judges
then, to paraphrase a well-worn epigram, were surer about
everything than judges today are about anything. That tech-
nique consisted of creating large, simple, but definite categories
under which offered items of proof could be classified accurately
and, above all, quickly. All the contents of each of these classes
were either black or white, admissible or inadmissible. The
largest of these categories of inadmissible evidence (though its
recognition as such was later than we usually suppose4 0) is
that of hearsay. The advantages of these clear-cut rules of
exclusion are obvious. They enable the lawyer preparing his
case to know in advance with fair certainty what he can get
in, and what he cannot. If a question as to admissibility does
arise, the judge who has no time for subtle discrimination in
the heat of trial can make a decision in his stride, as it were.
This is splendid, and the only difficulty is that it does not work.
The rule excluding all hearsay, clear and simple in its original
form, when it was tested by the offer of particular hearsay
evidence of a peculiarly indispensable or reliable kind cracked
under the strain. To relieve the pressure, exception after excep-
tion was recognized until today the rule is riddled with thirteen
-9 Suggested by Carpenter v. Asheville Power and Light Co., 191 N. C.
130, 131 S. E. 400 (1926).
40 Wigmore, op. cit. § 1364.
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or more exceptions. The exceptions are in some instances
quite as rigidly defined as the rule itself.
To be contrasted with this sort of progress through the miti-
gation of a rigid rule by numerous rigid exceptions, is the dif-
ferent technique of development of such rules as, for example,
those which provide for the order of presenting proof. These
have from the outset been merely guides and not limits to the
judge's discretion and consequently have never had to be com-
plicated by exceptions. Would it not have been wiser to set, up
the hearsay rule lso in some similar form, as for example:
"Hearsay is inadmissible except where the judge in his discretion
finds it needed and trustworthy"? The astonishing conserva-
tism of most lawyers 4' and of most judges drawn from their
ranks, and their almost religious reverence for these mere pro-
cedural rules, will make progress towards such a result slow,
but doubtless such a change is on the cards. At all events,
newly evolved evidence rules are likely to be of that discretion-
ary type.42
Focusing these considerations upon our present problem, we
find the orthodox, but not wholly settled or established, view to
be that conduct to show belief, to show the fact believed, is
invariably to be put in the "hearsay" category and banned as
such. The result is that evidence which has the strongest cir-
cumstantial guaranties of reliability may be banned. Evidence
that a doctor, since deceased, has operated upon a man for
appendicitis, would be inadmissible as evidence that the patient
actually had that disease. It is true, on the other hand, that
very much of such conduct-evidence if admitted would be of
trivial value and probably a general inclusionary rule, that all
such evidence is admissible wherever the actor's testimony on
the stand would be, would be only one degree better than whole-
sale exclusion. It would seem sensible to conclude that conduct
(other than assertions) when offered to show the actor's beliefs
and hence the truth of the facts so believed, being merely
analogous to and not identical with typical hearsay, ought to
be admissible whenever the trial judge in his discretion finds
that the action so vouched the belief as to give reasonable assur-
ance of trustworthiness.
4 See MoRGAN, op. cit. s=pra note 2, Ch. VI: "The Outlook for Reform."
-2 Compare the Massachusetts hearsay statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921)
c. 233, § 65: "A declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible
in evidence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith
before the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge
of the declarant."
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